


~~SECURITY INFORMATION--SECRET~~

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TARGETS
IN THE UNITED STATES
1946-1953



SEPTEMBER, 1953



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
John Edgar Hoover, Director

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INTRODUCTION

The insatiable desire of the Soviet Union for intelligence of an almost unbelievable scope and nature supplies the basis for this monograph. The range of intelligence targets in the United States indicated by the Soviets is, on the one hand, information vital to the security of the United States and, on the other hand, information of perhaps some domestic value to the Soviet Union, but not remotely connected with the actual security of the United States. Between these divergencies we find a large volume of targets that defy absolute classification in these two categories due to the lack of information from the Soviets indicating the specific need to be fulfilled by each target.

This study revealed that known or tentatively identified Soviet Intelligence Service agents operating in the United States were engaged in developing intelligence regarding specific targets, but were also in most instances, to a somewhat lesser degree, collecting information identical in nature and source with individuals or organizations representing the Soviet Union in other capacities. *

*Registered agents of Soviet principals, e. g., Amtorg Trading Corporation.

A review of intelligence target material developed by investigations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that regardless of the means employed to collect intelligence and regardless of the categorical topics of these targets, there appeared to be two logical classifications for consideration. The first classification, which is discussed generally in Part I, involves the mass collection of intelligence of a wide scope and/or of a general nature. The magnitude of material collected within this first classification suggests that the Soviets collect a broad sampling of our knowledge for possible refinement into specific or primary intelligence targets.

The second logical classification of intelligence targets appears to include those targets that are refined to specific or primary targets, and in this way indicates more specific Soviet Intelligence interests in the United States. As this phase of the study suggests more of a practical application to security and counterintelligence investigations, the material in this classification will be discussed comprehensively in Part II of this study.


It is not the purpose of this monograph to consider operational techniques of Soviet Intelligence as a subject for study, except as they apply to the definition of Soviet Intelligence targets.



PART I

PREFACE

A known Soviet espionage agent operating in the United States in 1949 instructed his espionage contact to obtain any documents, pamphlets or books deemed to be of importance or interest to the Soviet Union. During this same year another Soviet agent instructed his contact to attend an exhibit at the New York Public Library and to look for anything of interest and get it. On another occasion in 1951, still another known Soviet agent inquired of his experienced espionage contact about any reports or papers which might be useful or interesting. These statements supply the key to the first part of this study, the mass collection of intelligence from the United States by the Soviets.



A. FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORPORATION

One of the richest sources of mass intelligence information is found in nonfiction magazines, books, scientific or trade journals, and catalogs and publications of the United States Government.* Under the guise of trade, culture, education and academic interests, the Soviets have succeeded in siphoning for their own purposes the vast resources of these intelligence media. This siphoning process is achieved through such instrumentalities as the Four Continent Book Corporation, 253 Fifth Avenue, New York City, a registered agent of a Soviet principal.

Allan Markoff, president of Four Continent Book Corporation, in 1951, stated that its business of placing orders for publications in the United States to be transmitted to the Soviet Union amounted to approximately one quarter of a million dollars annually. Markoff estimated that orders worth approximately \$2,000 were placed annually with the Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Printing Office. This system of obtaining material for the Soviets was made more complex by the addition of another factor, the Franklin Square Agency of Englewood, New Jersey. According to a responsible official, the Franklin Square Agency acts as a magazine subscription agent for the Four Continent Book Corporation. Reliable informants have advised that Four

*See Appendix pages 52-65




Continent Book Corporation has for several years subscribed to practically every nonfiction magazine published in the United States.

According to the export manager of Four Continent Book Corporation, orders are placed with almost every book publisher in the United States. In order to give some indication of the mass collection of information involved, it may be of interest to note that Four Continent Book Corporation received the following book orders from its Soviet principal: in 1949, 16,329 orders, in 1950, 11,390 orders, and up to November 30, 1951, 11,931 orders.*

Through the agency of Four Continent Book Corporation, the Soviets have also been the recipients of intelligence from another source, the free mailing lists of commercial, industrial, scientific and political organizations or establishments. A sampling of letters of request for publications of this nature for delivery to addresses in the Soviet Union is included in the appendix of this monograph. A representative listing of Soviet addressees for United States publications is also set forth in the appendix. (See Appendix, pages 61-63)

The zeal with which these publications are followed may be illustrated by a request of the Four Continent Book Corporation in March, 1948. This

*This mass procurement of information for the Soviet Union has developed the refusal of some publishers. Four Continent was able to circumvent this difficulty by reordering the publications through other dealers who had previously purchased the desired publications from the "uncooperative" publisher.



request concerned an inquiry for a Coast and Geodetic Survey, United States Department of Commerce, publication, "Coast Pilot Alaska, Part III." Part III of that publication had not been printed at that time.

B. AMTORG TRADING CORPORATION

Amtorg, * a Soviet agency in New York City, has provided "cover" for Soviet Intelligence agents in the past and has also served as a direct means for gathering intelligence data. This has been accomplished not only by the purchase of products representing intelligence accomplishments, but also by the actual collection of intelligence information and in some instances the actual cataloging of information for dissemination in the Soviet Union.

Among the more widely known functions of Amtorg is the purchase, or arranging for the purchase, of products to be delivered to the Soviet Union. In addition to legitimate commercial transactions of this nature, Amtorg, it has been reported, engaged in the purchase of products for industrial espionage. A reliable informant alleged that about 1948, Amtorg placed orders for samples of "practically every" household item manufactured in the United States, in the amount of approximately \$70,000. Although Amtorg claimed that these items were to be displayed at a fair in the Soviet Union, the informant learned from another source that these items were to be used as samples for duplication in the Soviet Union.

*Amtorg is registered with the Attorney General of the United States under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, As Amended.



In 1946 and 1947, Amtorg placed orders with firms in the United States not only for equipment useful in atomic energy work, but also for equipment and material commonly used in other types of research, development and production activities in the United States. A manufacturer of electrostatic voltmeters, in February, 1948, decided to take stock of his exports to the Soviet Union. During the period of January, 1946 - February, 1948, the Soviet Union purchased 369 voltmeters with ranges from 100 to 5,000 volts. The total purchase of this equipment by American laboratories was only 104. During the same period, the Soviet Union purchased 136 voltmeters with ranges from 5,000 to 30,000 volts, whereas American laboratories purchased only 34.

Export controls exercised by the United States Government made it difficult for the Soviets to obtain certain types of products and equipment. A given manufacturer would refuse to sell a product for delivery to the Soviet Union because of export controls. As a result, a representative of Amtorg would attempt to purchase the material through a "middle man" for delivery to Amtorg in New York City, leaving to Amtorg the responsibility for delivery to the Soviet Union. In September, 1947, for example, United States authorities removed from the SS "Murmansk" at New York City certain radiation detection equipment designated for the Soviet Union which did not have an export license.



Just prior to 1946, Amtorg was quite active in obtaining a wide range of publications for shipment to the Soviet Union. This activity appeared to have been gradually taken over by the Four Continent Book Corporation and its sources. Included were requests for publications of the United States Government Printing Office, United States Government agencies, commercial and trade organizations.

A letter from Amtorg, dated January 11, 1946, to the American Society for Testing Materials, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, * is an example of Amtorg procedure in obtaining publication intelligence. This letter is quoted in part:


"... We desire to replenish the libraries of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, the Soviet Union Chamber of Commerce and also the libraries of the import trade organizations and other central and industrial libraries with current publications."

Another example of the Amtorg technique in collecting intelligence is a form letter utilized in 1949 to collect financial information regarding commercial concerns in the United States. (See Appendix, page 64, for example)

Amtorg and its agent, the Inreklama Service, ** New York City, performed a unique function in the collection and assembly of intelligence for Soviet consumption. The Amtorg Publishing Division in the late 1940s published a monthly catalog titled "American Engineering and Industry," for

*Requests for publications of this Society were subsequently taken over by Four Continent Book Corporation.

**Inreklama Service was a registered agent of Amtorg and International Book Company, Moscow, USSR.



distribution in the Soviet Union. This publication in the Russian language included pictures, drawings and descriptive data regarding engineering and industrial products allegedly for sale to the Soviet Union. In a similar vein the Inreklama Service also printed, in Russian for distribution within the Soviet Union, elaborate advertising brochures for prominent industrial concerns in the United States.


Inreklama Service promoted still a different style for mass intelligence collection by issuing a publication in the Russian language, "New American Books," for dissemination in the Soviet Union. This publication served as a catalog of American books and periodicals for prospective buyers in the Soviet Union.

C. TELEGRAPH AGENCY OF THE USSR (TASS)

Tass, another Soviet agency in the United States, has a prominent part in the collection of Soviet Intelligence target material in the United States. A supplemental registration statement submitted by Tass* in 1952 is quoted in part as follows:

"Beside our daily cable service, we transmit mail articles on subjects of less 'spot' character.... We also transmit a commercial service giving prices of grains, bristles, furs, etc., and other commercial and economic news. All of our news is transmitted to our home

*Tass is registered with the Attorney General of the United States under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, As Amended. Tass's main bureau is in New York City.




office in Moscow for distribution to Tass clients. We distribute nothing in the U.S. except for supplying copies of our news messages to the Soviet Embassy in Washington."

A reliable source has supplied information regarding the flow of Tass material to the Soviet Union. Taking at random the date January 2, 1951, it was noted that, in addition to clippings, current issues of the publications in the following fields were supplied: news, business, medicine, government, commerce, politics and industry. Beyond the normal flow of material to the Soviet Union with its broad intelligence potential, still more material is sent at specific requests from Moscow. In the latter instance, Tass has had arrangements with United States news services for extended coverage of sources not regularly available to Tass.

The newsgathering function of Tass deserves some appraisal. According to a reliable source, Tass has supplied Moscow with political intelligence regarding so-called weaknesses in American life.* Among such topics have been included the alleged neglect of Aleuts in Alaska, discrimination against Mexicans and Indians in the United States and the decline of the value of the American dollar. This, in effect, supplies the Soviets with political weapons for direction against the United States in the propaganda battle.

*It may be of interest to note that a Tass employee engaged in collecting this type of information was also engaged in military espionage.




Another phase of this newsgathering function is the supplying of "editorials" regarding information in the news. Among the indicated "editorials" have been such topics as Guam military installations and "All Weather Jets" made by the General Electric Company.

Tass, too, has been busy in making requests for mass publication material of both a commercial and governmental nature.* Under the guise of press activity with its prerogatives, the production of mass intelligence information would easily conform to Tass's functional requirements. Tass has taken advantage of opportunities presented and has added its weight to the collection of this pool of intelligence for the Soviet Union.

D. GENERAL

Other means have been used to collect information on Soviet Intelligence targets in the United States. In 1948, the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce utilized a form letter transmitted to industrial firms in the United States requesting industrial and commercial information. (See Appendix, page 65) Another illustration of the more direct approach is Amtorg and Soviet Government Purchasing Commission "inspectors" visiting various


*Resistance from governmental agencies has been met by Tass because of the lack of reciprocity in exchange of like material by the Soviet Union. This necessitates an indirect mailing procedure for transmittal of this material to the Soviet Union.



industrial concerns in the United States to "inspect" products under contract to the Soviet Union. In many instances the Soviet representatives asked questions which had nothing to do with the product under contract to the Soviet Union.

Soviet research and study groups in the United States were also in contact with desirable intelligence data. In 1946, Soviet engineers visited the Tennessee Valley Authority installations for the alleged purpose of obtaining information for a power station in the Soviet Union. In the same year, Soviet engineers visited the United States for the alleged purpose of studying the gas industry in the United States. They were reliably reported to have visited Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego, California. In connection with this tour, they visited gas and electric utilities, automobile production plants, water and sewerage systems.

A Soviet agent in July, 1949, requested his American collaborator to obtain catalogs and other publications from all United States Government agencies. Investigation has developed the information that the mass collection of publications issued by many of the Government agencies and offices has been the accomplished target of this and other identified or tentatively identified Soviet agents.



CONCLUSION

Briefly, from the foregoing, we can see a strong desire of the Soviet Union for our store of cumulative knowledge. The Soviets have availed themselves of the opportunity to abstract information freely, whether from the printed page or the finished product. This general intelligence target may furnish the necessary knowledge concerning certain intelligence targets or may inspire specific targets for further exploitation. Whether by overt, covert, direct or indirect means, dependent somewhat on restrictions relating to specific intelligence targets, the Soviets have collected intelligence regarding our plans, capabilities, achievements and ideas for their perverse use.

PART II

PREFACE

The seemingly limitless scope of intelligence interests and the media for the collection of mass intelligence have been considered in Part I of this monograph. This collection of intelligence may be based upon the direct request of Soviet libraries, research institutes or other governmental organizations in the Soviet Union. Investigation has also indicated that identified or tentatively identified Soviet Intelligence Service agents have played a part in the collection of intelligence en masse.

In Part II of this monograph specific and primary Soviet Intelligence targets in the United States are considered. Specific and primary targets are a refinement of the mass intelligence discussed in Part I. Various operational techniques used to collect intelligence sometimes obscure the actual importance the Soviets place on the information they are gathering. Operations of identified or tentatively identified Soviet Intelligence Service agents who were assigned specific targets, and who follow a sustained pattern of attempts to obtain particular information give the basis for the assembling of refined targets that will be discussed in Part II of this monograph.

Sometimes the choice of intelligence targets indicated by an identified or tentatively identified Soviet Intelligence Service agent has been qualified



by the following factors:

1. Attempt to deceive or divert attention
2. Use of target for testing new recruits or sources
3. Personal inquisitiveness and abilities of Soviet agent involved
4. Soviet agent's belief that information may be of interest to the Soviet Union
5. Concealment of actual target by interest in secondary target or targets indicated to cover or camouflage another bona fide target.

Although we are confronted with these limiting factors, we have the advantage of the previously mentioned operational information upon which to base a study of specific Soviet Intelligence targets in the United States.



A. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Chemistry

A science such as chemistry is a fundamental factor in the life of any major nation. This would also seem to apply to the Soviet Union, as indicated by a review of Soviet Intelligence targets in the United States since 1946. Efforts have been made by the Soviets to obtain penicillin "know how" through both commercial and Soviet Intelligence media.

The Soviet defector, Nikolai Mikhailovich Borodin, has described the numerous efforts of the Soviet Union to purchase the "know how" relating to the large-scale manufacture of penicillin from various companies in the United Kingdom and the United States. In July, 1946, the Amtorg Trading Corporation communicated with the Merck Company, New York City, expressing an interest in purchasing a penicillin plant to be erected in the Soviet Union. In 1947, Borodin was sent to the United States to effect such a purchase. In December of 1947, Borodin was instructed to cease his efforts in regard to the penicillin target in the United States and proceed to England. According to Borodin, this sudden lack of interest was due to United States export restrictions.

In the years 1951 and 1952, the Soviets again evidenced a strong desire for penicillin "know how." This new series of attempts to gain American "know-how" for penicillin production assumed the proportions of an intelligence




target of Soviet Intelligence agents in the United States. In connection with the clandestine purchase of this "know-how" the Soviet agents indicated that they were specifically interested in the following:

- a. Outline of basic principles (of process)
- b. Description of equipment needed in connection with the manufacturing process
- c. Method and procedure as first used in production
- d. Approximately how much penicillin had been made by this method
- e. Commercial value of the procedure
- f. Concerns using the particular procedure

Subsequently, (1952) the indicated penicillin targets became more modest. A Soviet agent specifically requested information concerning the following:

- a. "Ultrawets" used in the production of penicillin. The chemical composition and method used (in production)
- b. "Alkaterage-C," a substance allegedly used in the fermentation of penicillin, determination of its chemical composition, how obtained and how used (in production)
- c. Main raw materials used in the production of penicillin

Soviet Intelligence also exhibited a specific interest in other pharmaceutical developments or refinements, particularly in the field of antibiotics. In addition, to interest in penicillin, a specific interest was indicated in processes and production methods relating to rimocidin and "Compound E."



In connection with instructions given by a Soviet agent in the United States during the year 1951, there is perhaps a worthy example of an operational formula utilized in connection with the collection of mass intelligence but still having value as an indicator of a specific target or group of targets. This instruction identified as Soviet targets those pharmaceuticals which would be of benefit to mankind. Obviously the Soviets, although interested in this broad category of pharmaceuticals, could only specifically request those of which they were cognizant. The process of refining this broad intelligence target is illustrated in this operation.

The Soviet agent made reference to the April 26, 1951, issue of the New York Times which included an article reporting the first total synthesis of cortisone out of cheap and abundant raw materials, facilitating mass production. This Soviet agent requested detailed information regarding the composition of this new substance discovered by Doctor Robert B. Woodward. Although this specific request might have originated in the field operations of the Soviet Intelligence apparatus in the United States, sustained attempts to obtain information regarding Doctor Woodward's work in steroid chemistry would seem to indicate a headquarters interest and ratification of a bona fide specific intelligence target.



Another objective indicated by Soviet Intelligence agents in the United States during 1951 was details on the procedures used in the blood fractionation process as developed by Professor Edwin M. Cohn of Harvard University. The Soviet collaborator was instructed to obtain samples of equipment related to this process, namely, a tubing, a glass, a needle, an ampule, a bag, a syringe and an exchange resin or filter (may be duplications in equipment).

The Soviets in recent years have indicated interests in aviation medicine, photographic chemicals and other branches in the field of chemistry. These interests may represent a general need or an ignorance of a specific target objective in these fields. Since these interests were not refined to primary targets in these fields, they are of little conclusive value to a study of refined targets. It is being noted here that this middle ground of targets does exist and perhaps indicates a more than ordinary en masse collection of intelligence material.

2. Atomic Energy

A keynote to Soviet atomic energy targets in the United States may well be found in the statement attributed to an MGB (Soviet Ministry of State Security) agent in 1951. This statement bluntly advised that the Soviet Union was interested generally in atomic energy in the United States. It would be difficult to conceive of an intelligence target having a higher intelligence



priority for the Soviet Union than the field of atomic energy. A review of the pattern of Soviet requests for information in this category during the period of this study reveals comprehensive and continuing efforts to obtain target objectives. The Soviets indicated this interest in specific subject matter relating to atomic energy by informal conversations, requests for publications, purchases of equipment which might be utilized for atomic research, and clandestine Soviet Intelligence operations.

Perhaps the intense interest of Soviet Intelligence in nuclear research and the development of the atomic weapon is best personified by the activities of the convicted Soviet agents, Harry Gold, David Greenglass, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and Klaus Fuchs. * This is given more current significance by Soviet attempts to further penetrate the Atomic Energy Commission as indicated subsequently in this monograph.

According to the admitted Soviet agent, David Greenglass, his Soviet espionage superior, Julius Rosenberg, stated he had obtained "from one of the boys" the "mathematics" involved in the construction of an atomic energy airplane motor. Rosenberg also was alleged to have indicated that progress had been made in one of the major problems, shielding the power plant.

*Klaus Fuchs was a member of the British Atomic Energy Mission which came to the United States during World War II. Fuchs, who was employed at Los Alamos, New Mexico, departed from the United States in mid-1946.



Another informant, whose reliability cannot be accurately judged, stated that William Perl, formerly an employee of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in Cleveland, Ohio, had furnished Rosenberg with valuable plans for the use of "nuclear fission to propel airplanes."

In 1949, Nikolai A. Zhakhov, an employee of the Soviet Naval Attache's Office, Washington, D. C., displayed a special interest in the 1946 Bikini Atoll atomic bomb tests. In this connection, it might be pertinent to note that Zhakhov was involved in the mass collection of governmental publications by both overt and covert means, including available material on atomic energy from the United States Government Printing Office.

Soviet representatives in the United States either in connection with their legitimate functions or by clandestine measures have attempted to obtain the products of American ingenuity in the development of atomic energy and related subjects. As a further means of enlarging the scope of target material available, the Soviets have utilized the technique of seeking membership in an organization to gain access to trade publications or forums. Typical of this procedure was the Soviet attendance at a meeting of the American Rocket Society in April, 1953, at Baltimore, Maryland, and an attempt to seek membership in this society. A more specific target may be indicated with the knowledge that an official of the Air Research and Development Command was the main speaker on the potential use of atomic power in aircraft and rocket flight.



Perhaps an even better indication of specific Soviet interests in regard to atomic energy is illustrated in a discussion between two Soviet Intelligence agents and a sympathetic contact in the United States during October, 1952. This discussion indicated that one of the two Soviets involved had previously requested from this contact in the United States a list of signatures of scientists in the United States who stated their advocacy for outlawing the atomic bomb as a weapon. Obviously this information would be of value from both a propaganda and an operational viewpoint. Perhaps this list would include the name of a scientist sensitive enough to the "peace" propaganda of the Soviet Union to be another "Klaus Fuchs."

During this discussion, the Soviets indicated a specific interest in the use of atomic energy for the following purposes: peace, industry, agriculture, biology, and medicine. These Soviets also indicated an interest in information regarding shields against atomic radiation and the availability of fissionable material.

Whether the Soviets are groping for a more specific intelligence target from a base of ignorance or have more specific targets not yet identified, the fact remains that Soviet Intelligence activities in the United States indicate a continuing interest in the broad ramifications of atomic energy.

3. Electronics

In September, 1951, an employee of the Soviet Air Attache's Office in the United States advised his American collaborator to be alert for all new developments in the electronics field. More specifically this Soviet indicated an interest in what particular type of radar or other electronic equipment the United States Government was interested in developing. A review of Soviet operations in the United States from 1946 to date indicates three general objectives in this field of electronics: (a) a mass collection of both governmental and private technical publications and research papers; (b) a sampling of certain electronic products, which may represent groping or a specific intelligence target on the part of the Soviets; and (c) production and planning information.

Radar with its ramifications has received much attention from the Soviets in the United States during the past four years. In 1950, a clandestine intelligence operation involving an employee of the Soviet Naval Attache's Office, Washington, D. C., indicated specific interest in catalogs or operational information regarding General Electric or Raytheon radar equipment. Interest was also expressed in radar equipment catalogs issued by United States firms, such as Radio Corporation of America, Bendix, and Westinghouse. As might be looked for in connection with an intelligence operation



emanating from the Naval Attache's Office, naval radar and a description of modern radar equipment installed on the newest merchant ships were indicated as specific intelligence targets.

Recent years brought some refinements in radar intelligence requests. In connection with the Raytheon Manufacturing Company, the Soviets wanted to know production figures, "input" and "output" of various Raytheon radar units, and (radar) items in laboratory stage to be produced in 1952 under classified United States Navy or Air Force contracts. In 1951 and 1952, clandestine operations emphasized collection of information regarding harbor control radar. In addition to publications relative to this subject, Soviet agents specifically requested information regarding the following radar parts or equipment allegedly used by the United States Navy:

1. Part number "AN/FPS-2"
2. Part number "AN/FPS-F"
3. Part number "AN/FPS-3" and
4. Part number "AN/FPS-8"*

In the last three years, the Soviets in their clandestine intelligence operations have indicated a specific interest in still other types of radar equipment. This included a radar computer, designated AN/ARA-25, manufactured by the Collins Radio Company, Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Raytheon

*Circumstances surrounding this request would indicate that the Soviet agent involved was not initially cognizant of this part.

Manufacturing Company power tubes RK5J26 and RK2J51 (application; fire control); and radar equipment part number CPS18, TPN18 and TPX18* (not otherwise identified).

One Soviet operation indicated a Soviet interest in an alleged contract for radar equipment between a United States manufacturer and the Swedish Government. This is being noted at this point as it was in the nature of a specific intelligence assignment which did not fit into the pattern of specific radar intelligence assignments of the period.

Another prominent electronics target of a specific nature is the electronic tube.** In 1949, the Soviets indicated a specific interest in Raytheon (Manufacturing Company) tubes for "ultra high" and "very high" frequency transmitters and receivers. In following years the Soviets continued their interest in Raytheon tubes, particularly regarding the outputs, frequencies and various properties of magnetron*** and klystron tubes. A Soviet Intelligence operation in 1951 gave this broad target some refinement by indicating specific interest in a new miniature magnetron (produced by Raytheon Manufacturing Company) of "extremely high power" and particularly those models used in United States Navy vessels. It may be of still further interest

*Circumstances indicate these targets might have developed from earlier specific target information successfully acquired.

**According to David Greenglass, sometime prior to 1950, Julius Rosenberg stated that the Russians were very weak in electronics and radio tubes.

***In 1951, the Soviets expressed interest in a modulator to work with magnetron, output from 10 to 20 megawatts.




to note that in early 1953 a Soviet representative purchased electronic equipment which might be utilized for the construction of subminiature transmitters.

Soviet agents operating out of the Soviet Naval Attache's Office in 1951 and 1952 indicated interest in the "General Electric" automatic pilot presumed to be for use on both merchant and United States Navy vessels. This intelligence target was specific and closely supervised on an operational basis by the Soviets.

Soviet representatives have in recent months been attending various electronics conferences, conventions, exhibitions and, of course, have pursued their voluminous collection of publications relating to the field of electronics. In 1953, a Soviet representative indicated an interest in engaging a United States firm of electronics specialists to train Soviet personnel in electronics. This might well have been an operational ruse utilized by this Soviet, but could reasonably indicate a Soviet intelligence need.

4. Technology

The Soviets have followed with persistence, both overtly and covertly, technological advancements of the United States. Their comprehensive collection of technological products, publications and scientific studies have made it virtually impossible to give special significance to special targets. From



among this mass of information stand two items which should be noted in view of their relation to other indicated Soviet Intelligence targets and the special operational consideration given to them. These targets are:

- a. Information concerning a gyro-navigator, a navigational device allegedly submitted by the inventor to the United States Navy and Commerce Departments in June, 1950
- b. Information regarding a pump for circulation of blood

5. Aeronautics

During the period 1946-1949, Julius Rosenberg (convicted in 1951 as a Soviet agent), had specific aeronautical interests. According to David Greenglass, who admitted conspiring with Rosenberg to commit espionage for the Soviet Union, Rosenberg indicated interest in jet airplanes and sky platform research.

In December, 1951, a Soviet agent in the United States indicated to a collaborator that he was only interested in experimental jet aircraft and not otherwise interested in products of the Martin Aircraft plant in Baltimore, Maryland. It may be of interest to contrast this with the intelligence targets of a Soviet operating out of the Air Attache's Office. This Soviet indicated a specific interest in guided missiles allegedly manufactured by the "Martin plant." In addition the latter Soviet representative was interested in purchasing items involving air-borne electrical equipment and obtaining a high altitude pressure flying suit. *

*See page 29 for further reference to high altitude pressure flying suit.

The preceding pages tend to verify the statement of a Soviet agent in 1951 that the Soviet Union is interested in anything of a scientific nature. This broad secondary target is refined into those scientific developments which are desired by the Soviet Union, not only for military use, but to give false witness to the world of the "genius" of a Communist Russia.

B. UNITED STATES DEFENSE FACILITIES

1. Equipment and Related Projects

Defense equipment can not be considered entirely separate from scientific research and development. Much scientific research and development is based upon defense requirements, whether conducted at private or governmental expense. In order to give a more comprehensive picture, this section should be read in conjunction with material appearing in the section of this monograph captioned "Scientific Research and Development."

Max Elitcher, an associate of the convicted Soviet agents Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell, was employed in the Bureau of Ordnance, Department of the Navy, Washington, D. C., during the latter part of World War II. There he was engaged in a fire control project. In about the middle of 1946 and subsequently, according to Elitcher, the Rosenberg apparatus was interested in this project and Sobell requested reports or pamphlets on the "Mark 56 Project."

Among the other indicated Soviet Intelligence targets in the United States Navy were the following:

- a. In 1947 Rear Admiral Eugeni G. Glinkov, the Soviet Naval Attache tried to "pump" a United States Naval officer for information concerning guided missile experiments undertaken by the United States Navy. Glinkov was particularly concerned with the ability of the Navy to launch rockets from aboard ships at sea.
- b. In 1951, Soviet representatives indicated specific interest in Sections 7 and 8 for Model SG-6B, instruction book for Navy radar and similar Navy radar equipment.
- c. Sperry (Gyroscope) production for the United States Navy and bombsights produced for the Navy were also of interest to the Soviets in 1951.
- d. In 1952, a newly arrived Soviet Military and Naval Attache, who was engaged in Soviet Intelligence operations, indicated an interest in "Mariner" type vessels and their potential for conversion to wartime use. This intelligence target was continued and elaborated on during the following year to include information regarding:
 - (1) Troop-carrying capacity
 - (2) Number and size of guns they could mount
 - (3) Type of armor used in their construction
 - (4) Number of tanks which could be shut off in the event of a torpedoing, and
 - (5) Type of radar, sounding devices, log and sonic devices used on these ships

The Soviet operation, which was interested in "Mariner" type vessels, also indicated an interest in a new navigational device. This device was described as a new type ship's log (not the new Swedish log) which indicates the vessel's speed as well as the wind and current drift.

The Soviets have displayed both overt and covert intelligence interests in United States military and naval aircraft. An interesting illustration of a technique utilized by the Soviets to obtain all possible information in this regard took place in early 1950. The Soviet agent instructed his American collaborator to get an early 1950 issue of Aviation Week which lists from 24 to 36 manufacturers of United States military and naval aircraft engines. From this list it was to be determined if any of the manufacturers would be able to supply information which would identify the aircraft for which these engines were designed.

In connection with United States Air Force exhibits, official Soviet representatives have indicated their interests in specific equipment by photographing or making notes concerning the same. In 1951 they indicated an interest in this manner in regard to the following:

- a. B-36
- b. F-84E
- c. F-86E
- d. Navy radio-controlled F-675K Drone
- e. Navy jet fighter plane F-7U
- f. J-47, and
- g. Jet engines

Perhaps one of the targets arousing most Soviet interest in connection with military aircraft has been the bombsight. In recent years, Soviet inquiries relating to this target have been concentrated on bombsights used

in aircraft designed to carry the A-bomb, an electrical device allegedly designed for a bombsight, the Sperry bombsight, and the K-1 and K-2 bombsights.

Among their interests in equipment the Soviets have mentioned United States military uniforms and insignia. In 1953, a Soviet representative attending a military exhibit in the United States evidenced interest by photographing the following equipment:

- a. Anti-aircraft guns
- b. A 3,000 gallon collapsible tank
- c. A gasoline dispenser
- d. Quartermaster equipment

It is believed, however, that more significance can be given to an intelligence target indicated by two Soviet principals in connection with their operations, namely a high altitude pressure flying suit.

2. Training or Regulations

A Soviet agent in the United States in 1949 who was involved in the collection of mass intelligence data largely from governmental sources indicated to his clandestine contact a specific interest in United States Army or Navy service manuals. In 1950, another Soviet identified with Soviet Intelligence operations in the United States indicated a specific interest in whether an Army language school was in fact an intelligence school. This Soviet was interested in the school instructors, administrative staff and those



students of the Russian language who continued their studies at Columbia University. *


An Assistant Soviet Air Attache in 1951 expressed an interest in "fighter pilot" manuals published since 1946. He also requested manuals on morale and discipline in connection with the United States military establishment. This Soviet indicated an interest in classified material generally, but specifically requested the following documents or publications:

- a. Training Directive for Air-Ground Operation, September, 1950
- b. Conduct of Air-Ground Operation, June, 1950
- c. Air Force Manual, College of General Staff and Command, September, 1950
- d. "Southern Pine" exercise conducted by the Armed Forces of the United States in 1951
- e. AFM50-6, "Individual Training Squads," identified as a compilation of United States Air Force orders
- f. Operating instructions and other fighter plane material

The following year the Soviets indicated a specific interest in the Air Force atomic energy instruction and wanted to know who was taking part, the number of participants and the course of instruction.

*The interest of the Soviets in Army training also may be indicated by an attempt in late 1952 to obtain public source material regarding "Manual of Army List of Schools."

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
3. Strength

In early 1950, or prior thereto, an agent of the Soviet Ministry of State Security claimed that he had been successful in obtaining information concerning the production rate and the number of atomic bombs stockpiled in the United States and also photographs of atomic bunkers. Regardless of the alleged success of the Soviets in this venture, the assertion of this Soviet agent would at least indicate an expressed desire to obtain this information.

Information developed from the operations of three separate Soviet agents in the United States in 1950 indicated a specific desire for information regarding military preparations and preparedness. These Soviets were interested in figures regarding the mobilization of manpower and mass contracts for war material, not only for a determination as to strength, but as an indicator of urgent war preparations. Subsequent years indicated a continuing interest in this subject with such intelligence targets as:

- a. Identity of firms in New England manufacturing arms for delivery to France.
- b. Aircraft production of major United States companies
- c. The number of air divisions defending continental United States
- d. And a mass of publication material which would indicate the numerical and material strength of the armed forces.

GA 100



4. Strategy and Tactics

Probably a great deal of intelligence collected by the Soviets reveals to them some degree of our plans and strategy. As was pointed out previously, a Soviet agent indicated interest in our military strength for perhaps a more primary purpose of determining urgent war preparations. From the collateral information accumulated by the Soviets, there is the possibility that they may piece together a program of the strategy and tactics of the United States.

In 1951, a Soviet agent indicated an interest in the method by which defense contracts are normally granted. Although this information might be utilized as the basis for some operational scheme to determine defense production interests of the United States, a significant departure from normal government procurement procedure could be utilized as an indicator of changing strategy or tactics.

In 1952, a clandestine Soviet Intelligence operator was interested in determining the objective of the United States Air Force in hiring civilian employees for service in Greenland. Perhaps the Soviets believed that this too might be an indicator of U. S. military plans for the future.

Some of the more significant intelligence targets of the Soviets in the United States in 1951 and subsequent thereto are:



- a. Information regarding American schedules, limitations and preparations for war
- b. Information regarding tactical operations of the United States Air Force
- c. Information regarding any instructions to masters of foreign vessels in connection with convoys in the event of war
- d. Information from United States Air Force regarding data on air installations and possible USAF bombing targets in the USSR

C. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the period immediately following World War II, Soviet Intelligence targets regarding international relations notably included the United States intentions in Far Eastern matters. Although the war in Korea enlivened Soviet interests in United States policies in that area, Soviet Intelligence activity in the United States also included the United Nations Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

1. United States - Far East

A Soviet agent operating in the United States during recent years, who was primarily interested in political information, stated that he was cognizant of the United States policy in 1947 in the event of fighting in Hong Kong. During the same time the Soviets indicated interest in America's future plans regarding Japan, America's attitude toward the peace talks and talk among Japanese people in regard to the "coming elections."

2. United Nations Organization

The Communist North Korean army invasion of the Republic of Korea in 1950 and the resultant United Nations action shifted the emphasis on Soviet Intelligence targets to reactions in United Nations circles to the Korean War and subsequently to the Korean prisoner of war issue and the peace move. Other pressing questions by Soviet representatives in the United States included the attitude of the United Nations toward governments in exile and the selection of a successor to Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations Organization.

3. North Atlantic Treaty Nations

a. France-United States

In 1950, investigation indicated that the Soviets were quite interested in relations between France and the United States. A Soviet agent in the United States indicated the following specific intelligence targets in 1950:

- (1) Identification of firms in the United States sending arms to France; dates and ports of departure from the United States and arrival in France concerning all shipments of arms and ammunition, and details regarding the quantity and identification of the cargo
- (2) Information concerning the visit of French Minister of Defense Jules Moch to the United States (September, 1950)
- (3) Aid to Indo-China

During the following years the Soviets evidenced specific interest in high policy targets. They were particularly interested in meetings between General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then NATO Commander, and French authorities; proposed meetings between President Truman and Prime Minister Rene Pleven of France; President Truman and President Vincent Auriol of France; and information regarding the exchange of documents between the United States Department of State and the French Embassy.


In 1953, the Soviets were interested in determining the objective of the "recent" visit to the United States of French Premier Rene Mayer.

b. United Kingdom-United States

The primary Soviet targets indicated by counterintelligence investigation in connection with the relationships between the United Kingdom and the United States involved, first, the visits and conferences of former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and, more recently, those of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.

4. Germany

The Soviets have attempted to obtain any information regarding the rearmament of Germany. They have wanted to know of any secret clauses attached to the "German Peace Treaty" and the United States policy toward Germany.



5. General

In connection with international relations, the Soviets were interested in specific international conferences and, of course, the results of these conferences. A Soviet principal in the United States indicated specific interest in North Atlantic Treaty Conferences of September, 1950, in New York City and December, 1950, in Brussels, Belgium. This and other Soviet principals indicated interests in results of such conferences and made inquiries regarding defense agreements, the rearmament of Europe, embargoes, and economic information with international ramifications.

D. POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Opinions and Reactions in the United States

An agent of the Ministry of State Security organization in 1949 was allegedly interested in the "mood" of veterans (and veterans' organizations) in the United States. In addition, this person wanted to identify those persons in the United States who could be classified as "instigators" of war.

In the following year, other Soviets were interested in American reactions to general political questions. They wanted American opinions regarding labor unions, war in general and the Korean war in particular. It may be of interest to note that the Soviets were not only interested in the opinions of Americans but particularly interested in just how these opinions were formulated against the Soviet Union.

A Soviet Intelligence agent in the United States who was also identified with Soviet propaganda activities in this country was particularly interested in the thinking of military establishment personnel. He was interested in topics of conversation and the general attitude of Pentagon employees; comments on reason for resignation of General George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense; reaction of a visit of General Eisenhower to Washington, D. C.; and news of any dissatisfaction among military personnel.

Other Soviet agents were specifically interested in domestic political matters, e. g., the reactions of Republican Party leaders to the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur from his command, the platforms of the political parties prior to the national conventions of the major parties, and general reactions to the foreign policy plans of the political parties.

In addition to "taking the pulse" of America to determine sentiment concerning American institutions, the Soviets were interested in Communist counterforces in our domestic life. They wanted to know American reaction to "peace" organizations and "Smith Act"* violators.

2. Information Regarding Important Persons

Soviet Intelligence agents were also collecting information regarding important persons in the United States. According to information developed

*The eleven top Communist Leaders convicted October 14, 1949, on charges of violation of the Smith Act.

by investigation, the Soviets were interested in identifying important persons and their spheres of influence, then in attempts to compromise, neutralize or enlist them.

Among those about whom the Soviets have wanted information for their ulterior purposes were John Foster Dulles, Governors Thomas E. Dewey and Earl Warren, former President Truman, former Secretary of State Acheson, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, * a number of unidentified generals of the United States including General Lucius Clay and General Eisenhower* and FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover. *

Particularly in 1948 and 1950, the Soviets indicated a specific interest in the domestic politics of the United States. The White House presented an intriguing target for the Soviets. They were interested in any power behind the former President Truman who might "control" the White House. In connection with interest evidenced by the Soviets in Francis Cardinal Spellman, they wished to learn his "contact" at the White House.

Another figure in the United States, Henry Wallace, presented a different type of political target for the Soviets. A source believed to be reliable advised that the Soviets were interested in measures that might help Wallace politically. According to this source, the Soviets subsequently lost interest in Wallace.

*Soviet Intelligence agents were alleged to have indicated a continued interest in this individual.

E. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

In 1949, a Soviet Intelligence operation was initiated in the United States on the broad target of obtaining information concerning the operations of American Intelligence Services in Europe. Although the indicated intelligence targets would tend, for the most part, to be limited by the Soviet collaborator, specific targets were identified which may indicate Soviet Intelligence requirements and interests.

The Soviets indicated an interest in information concerning the intelligence arm of the United States Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency and "General Eisenhower's Intelligence." This interest seemed to center around intelligence sources, agents and agent networks, reporting methods, interrogation methods, what was known about Soviet installations and capabilities, and the interest of the United States Air Force in air forces of countries other than the Soviet Union and its satellites.


In connection with the Central Intelligence Agency functions, the Soviets indicated an interest in the dissemination and content of reports, sources of information and knowledge developed concerning interrogation methods utilized by the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellites.

The Soviet interest in the intelligence functions of the United States Air Force concerned specifically its covert methods. In connection with

personnel, the Soviets were interested in the identities of United States Air Force Intelligence personnel going overseas and the heads of the USAF interrogation units in the Far East. United States Air Force interrogation procedures and plans were of interest to a Soviet Intelligence agent. He indicated interest in interrogation personnel, interrogation reports, priority of interrogating Soviet personnel, the USAF interrogation guide and procedures. Perhaps as a related sidelight, this Soviet indicated an interest in the status of a defected Soviet airman in the United States.

This Soviet principal gave a general target formula. He stated his interest in what the USAF knows about a given subject and what the USAF wants to know in this regard. More specifically he was interested in anything the American Intelligence agencies know about Russian capabilities, installations and USAF bombing targets in the Soviet Union.

Another Soviet operation involving Judith Coplon, a former employee of the Foreign Agents Registration Section of the Department of Justice, indicated a Soviet Intelligence interest in security and counterintelligence functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At the time of her arrest in New York City on March 4, 1949, she had information in her possession from 34 FBI reports on security matters, including the subject of each investigation and the identity of the Special Agent preparing each report. Other information indicated that Coplon had as a specific intelligence target the FBI reports on Soviet Intelligence and Communist activities in the United States.



F. SOVIET PENETRATION TARGETS

1. Emigre-Oppositionist Groups

The Soviets have indicated an interest in penetrating certain oppositionist groups in the United States. One of the principal categories of this nature has been the Russian emigre or refugee groups. An alleged basis for this interest in the domestic affairs of the United States has been based upon the theory that these emigre groups with their contacts in the Soviet Union represent an internal security threat to the Soviet Union. The Soviet conception of this idea may best be expressed by an intelligence operation in 1952 and early 1953 which developed targets commensurate with this theory.

This Soviet stated an interest in any information regarding displaced persons which would be of assistance to the Soviet Union. The more specific targets within this category which appeared to be of a defensive nature for the Soviets were:

- a. Identify displaced persons to be utilized by "U. S. Intelligence" for espionage and sabotage in the Soviet Union
- b. Determine whether the various displaced persons in the United States have relatives in the Soviet Union
- c. Develop information concerning displaced persons with relatives in the Soviet Union

The Soviets have continued an interest in refugees or displaced persons organizations, groups or individuals. They have wished to identify any violently anti-Soviet organization, regardless of size and the displaced persons belonging to the organization. Perhaps as an aid to the penetration of these groups, they were also interested in the names and history of the younger displaced persons, "especially those with even the slightest pro-Soviet leanings."

In connection with efforts to reactivate a former intelligence agent in early 1951, the Soviet principal stated a specific interest in a specialized emigre group, "non-Jewish, Nazi or Fascist scientists."* Subsequent meetings with this Soviet principal indicated the Soviet interest in friends and acquaintances of the American collaborator engaged in scientific work. As a penetration project, this might indicate an interest in an emigre group potentially dangerous to the Soviet Union or might be an expression of intelligence interest in potential sources of information in scientific matters.

2. Religious-Oppositionist Groups

In 1947, a Soviet Intelligence agent allegedly attempted to obtain for his own purposes, a letter of reference from Archbishop Metropolitan Theophilus. This could be utilized for giving a Soviet agent a recognized or reputable position in an anti-Soviet Russian community in the United States.

*Although the Soviet principal might have been interested in a particular group of scientists, in this instance the approach might have been suggested by the similar former activities of the agent to be reactivated and the distaste of this former agent for Nazi persecution of the Jewish people.




According to a source involved in Ministry of State Security operations, the Soviets have expressed a specific interest in penetrating the activities of Francis Cardinal Spellman. Consideration was given to accomplishing this project by attempting to place a secretary in the office of Cardinal Spellman.

The Soviets undoubtedly fear the moral forces of the church and would like to eliminate or neutralize this adversary. They do not hesitate, however, to utilize the prestige of the church for their own purposes.

3. Professional Fields

Various intelligence operations of the Soviets in the United States have indicated a specific interest in penetrating groups of scientists and engineers dealing with atomic energy, radar and radio matters. The Rosenberg apparatus was pressing for additional penetration of the scientific and engineering fields. Another Soviet agent indicated that he had obtained a list of signatures of scientists of the United States who "came out" for outlawing the atomic bomb as a weapon. This might well serve as a recruiting basis for penetrating this group of atomic scientists. Still another operation was interested in persons in atomic energy work or persons who had friends in such work.

Although Soviet penetration operations were seemingly concentrated on atomic scientists, another Soviet Intelligence operation was intent upon



identifying and developing information concerning a much wider circle of scientists in the United States. Based upon this it would appear that the Soviets were penetrating the professional fields groping for additional specific target material.

4. United States Government

A review of the interest of the Soviets in penetrating the United States Government reveals a broad interest in governmental departments and agencies with a specific interest in those associated with our national defense.

In 1949, one Soviet operation was interested in developing contacts in governmental agencies, particularly in libraries and records sections.* A Soviet agent who was an employee of the Soviet Naval Attache's Office was engaged in collecting mass data from various governmental agencies. In connection with this phase of his operations, this Soviet was interested in establishing a contact in the Publications Control Section, Navy Yards and Docks Annex, Washington, D. C.

In 1951, another Soviet Intelligence operation indicated a great interest in the national defense establishment, particularly the United States Air Force. This operation was generally interested in any classified information and documents that could be taken from the collaborator's office and

*Special interest was indicated in the United States Army, Navy, and National Security Resources Board.

returned the same evening. The penetration of the United States Air Force at the Pentagon required certain security information:

- a. Was a pass needed to enter the Pentagon?
- b. Identities of persons in collaborator's office who signed for "reports"
- c. Identity of person who handled "reports" marked for destruction
- d. Accessibility of reports filed for future use
- e. How long could collaborator keep reports?
- f. Could collaborator take home "reports" legally?
- g. Did employees work overtime?
- h. Were the work boxes locked at night?

The investigation of Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell revealed a special interest in penetrating the United States Navy Bureau of Ordnance. Another Soviet Intelligence operation was interested in penetrating the closed hearings of the Congressional "Merchant Marine Committee" (House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries). Other Soviet penetration interests were the Atomic Energy Commission* and the Displaced Persons Commission, Vienna, Austria.

According to information developed by investigation, the Soviets in two apparently separate operations indicated an interest in penetrating the

*In this connection an interest was displayed in the security measures of the office buildings of the AEC.


overseas activities of the United States State Department. During the years 1949 and 1950, the Soviets allegedly wished to recruit a collaborator in the United States Embassy, Paris, France.

5. Penetration of Official Missions in the United States and the United Nations Organization

A Soviet Intelligence operation in 1950 indicated as a specific target the penetration of official French circles in the United States. This operation indicated a specific interest in the procedural matters of the French Consulate, New York City, in connection with obtaining visas. In this connection, the Soviet principal wanted to determine just what nationalities received French visas; whether the French maintain a "suspect list" against which visa applications are checked; and if any such suspect list includes names of Communists or suspected Communists?

This Soviet Intelligence principal was also interested in other matters relating to the French Consulate: the procedure for handling diplomatic mail; the existence of a French counterintelligence service in the consulate; and whether it exchanged information with American agencies.

Officials and employees of diplomatic and nondiplomatic British representation in the United States were also targets of the Soviets. Included were the British Embassy, the British Information Service and the British



Delegation to the United Nations Organization. Regarding the British Information Service, a Soviet Intelligence principal wanted to identify the duties of this organization in New York City and its relationship in the British Government. In this connection, he wished to know whether this service handled all the material for Sir Gladwyn Jebb, British United Nations Delegate, and acted as a censor for information passed by the American and British Governments.*

G. SOVIET OPERATIONAL TARGETS

Among the Soviet targets which should not be ignored are those essentially of a service nature. These targets facilitate the accomplishment of other Soviet Intelligence objectives.

Many of the operational problems which confront "illegally" based intelligence operations are not an immediate problem for the Soviets who currently are operating from a "legal" base in the United States. In connection with a potentially "illegal" commercial cover for a Soviet Intelligence operation in the United States in 1950, the Soviets indicated an interest in certain frozen funds outside of the Soviet Union which might be utilized in these countries by Soviet commercial "cover" firms.

*The Soviet agent stated that the only way the Soviet objective of "peace" in the world could be achieved was knowing the inner working of the American and British governments and by acting first.

Perhaps one of the most prominent tasks of "legally" based Soviet Intelligence is the identification of potential sources or recruits to assist in its operations. This is suggested by various counterintelligence investigations. A Soviet operation, which in 1949 was interested in collection of mass publication material, was interested in developing contacts in the libraries and record sections of various governmental agencies. The principal of this Soviet apparatus indicated as an operational target the telephone directory of the "national defense establishment." He stated that he wanted to check some names. In 1950, another operation interested in international political matters indicated as an operational target the names of all employees of the foreign consulates located in New York City. In 1951, still another Soviet operation stated an interest in obtaining telephone directories of all the governmental agencies, specifically of the Department of Justice.

In 1951 and 1952, the Soviets displayed an interest in a slightly different identification operation. The device they indicated was to assist tactical objectives by identifying persons in the United States who were "against war" and could "stop war." In addition they wished to identify a person or group with whom the Soviets might discuss the possibility of an economic treaty in furtherance of economic peace.

The Soviets have been making use of other operational devices to obtain certain publication material without their interest being discovered.



Exemplary of this the Soviets instructed collaborators to use the cover of a school or commercial firm for requesting certain publications on behalf of the Soviets. More recently the Soviets have indicated their desire to establish a "cut out" by utilizing cooperating foreign press representatives, foreign students and a non-Soviet and non-Soviet satellite diplomatic representative in the United States.

Other operational targets such as maildrops and methods of obtaining United States visas and passports have continued to be of interest to the Soviets. In regard to the latter target, they requested all necessary information required to execute an application for a United States passport; ways to obtain a visa to re-enter the United States; and the procedures related to entering and departing this country.



CONCLUSION

This review discloses a desire of the Soviet Union for intelligence from our vast store of cumulative knowledge. In order to dispel any vague or highly generalized concept of Soviet intelligence targets, this monograph has considered the expressed desire of the Soviets in two categories:

(1) a desire for a general accumulation of mass intelligence data for study and subsequent selection of specific intelligence targets; and (2) a desire for specific intelligence to fulfill a need or interest of the Soviets.

The material in this monograph may serve to verify the thoughts of some and alert others to the security and counterintelligence problems involved in neutralizing the collection of intelligence in the United States by the Soviets. The primary purpose of this presentation of Soviet intelligence targets is to provide a factor for consideration in estimating the intensity and scope of intelligence interests or needs of the Soviet Union.

APPENDIX

70500



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December 15, 1950

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Fisiko-Khimich.

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in the Field of Physics and Chemistry
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MOSCOW, USSR

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
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Yours very truly,

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BJ:sl
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Refer to page 3



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Kindly confirm by returning the attached self-addressed postcard.

Thank you for your kind co-operation and early reply.

Very truly yours,


Blanche Jackson
Subscription Dept.

BJ:sl
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*Soviet Information Bureau

Refer to page 3

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Copy

December 15, 1950

National Office of Vital
Statistics
Federal Security Agency
U. S. Public Health Service
Washington 25, D. C.

Ord. 01.10/10

Gentlemen:

We received a renewal order for the 1951 for one copy of **VITAL STATISTICS-SPECIAL REPORTS** from the following client:

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B. Vusovski per. 2
MOSCOW, USSR

This client was serviced by you gratis for the year 1950 and we would ask you to kindly continue sending your publication to the above address in 1951.

Kindly confirm so that we may advise our client that this order was accepted. For your convenience we are enclosing herewith a self-addressed postcard.

Yours very truly,

Blanche Jackson
Subscription Dept.

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Encl.

*Central Statistical Administration Library

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Copy

December 18, 1950

Ref. 81/01/10

RE: PEGASUS

Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, N. Y.

Gentlemen:

We received an order for the year 1951 for ONE copy of the above publication from the following client:

Ministerstvo
Aviapromyshlennosti *
Ulanskij, 22
MOSCOW, USSR

Please add this address to your free mailing list for the year 1951.

Kindly confirm. For your convenience we are enclosing herewith a self-address postcard.

Thank you for your kind cooperation in this matter.

Very truly yours,


Blanche Jackson
Subscription Dept.

BJ:sl
Encl.

*Ministry of Aviation Industry

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Copy

Jan. 4, 1951

Society for the Prevention
of World War III
515 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Ref. 01/11/3

RE: PREVENT WORLD WAR III

Gentlemen:

Please note the change of address of our client whose name was put
on your permanent mailing list in 1950:

1950 address

SOVINFORMBURO *
Ul. Stanislavskogo, 10
Moscow, USSR

Please change for 1951 to:

SOVINFORMBURO *
Ul. Zhdanova, 21
Moscow, USSR

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Yours very truly,

FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORPORATION


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Blanche Jackson
Subscription Div.

*Soviet Information Bureau

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Copy

Jan. 4, 1951.

Mayo Clinic
Rochester, Minn.

Ref. 01/44/59

Gentlemen:

Kindly add the following address to your permanent free mailing list for one copy of

PROCEEDINGS of the STAFF MEETINGS of the MAYO CLINIC

to be addressed as follows:

Publichnaia Biblioteka *
Sadovaia 18
Leningrad, USSR

Kindly confirm by returning the enclosed postcard to us.

Thank you for your kind cooperation and early reply.

Yours very truly,

BJ:sl
encl.

Blanche Jackson
Subscription Dept.

*Public Library

Refer to page 3



Copy

Jan. 4, 1951.

National City Bank
55 Wall Street
New York, N. Y.

RE: Monthly Letter of
Economic Contitions

Gentlemen:

Kindly retain the following addresses on your free mailing list for the year 1951 for one copy each of the above publication:

Ord. 29/23/11
Centralnaja
Biblioteka Vneshtorga *
U1. Kujbysheva 23
Moscow, USSR

Ord. 01/44/52
Publichnaia Biblioteka **
Sadovaia, 18
Leningrad USSR

Kindly confirm by returning the enclosed self-addressed postcard.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Yours very truly,

Blanche Jackson
Subscription Dept.

BJ:sl
encl.

*Central Library of the Foreign Trade Ministry
**Public Library

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Copy

January 4, 1951.

University of Illinois
Engineering Experiment Station
Urbana, Ill.

Ref. 98/3/23

Re: ENGINEERING EXPERIMENT STATION BULLETIN
(Catalog of Publications)

Gentlemen:

Kindly enter our standing order for all bulletins issued during the calendar year 1951 (one copy each) to be sent to:

Sektor Spetsbibliotek
Akademii Nauk SSSR *
Ul. Kujbysheva, 8
Moscow 12, USSR

Kindly confirm. For your convenience we are enclosing herewith a self-addressed postcard.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Yours very truly,


FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORPORATION

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Blanche Jackson
Subscription Dept.

***Section of the Special Library of the USSR Academy of Sciences**

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Copy

June 1, 1951.

General Radio Co. ,
275 Mass. Avenue
Cambridge 39, Mass.

RE: GENERAL RADIO EXPERIMENTER

Gentlemen:

One of our clients is interested in receiving your publication.
Kindly add the following address to your free mailing list for
1951:

Ref. 93/01/2 - One copy
Biblioteka
Glavnyj Pochtamt *
Pocht. jaschik 1323
Moscow, USSR.

Kindly confirm by returning the enclosed self-addressed postcard.

Thank you for your kind cooperation and early reply.

Very truly yours,

BJ:sl

Blanche Jackson
Subscription Dept.

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


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
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"Bureau of Tech. Inform. of Ministry of Coal Ind."
"Central Aeroclub named after V. P. Chkalov"
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"Committee on Measures and Measuring Instruments"
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 "Library of the Ministry of Oil Industry"
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 "Sc. -Techn. Libr., P.O. Box 792"
 "Sc. -Technical Library of the Moscow Soviet"
 "Scientific & Technical Library, Leningrad Branch"
 "Second Sc. -Research Inst. of Physics of the Moscow Univ. "
 "State Building Committee, Library"
 "State Central Medical Libr. "
 "State Lenin Library of USSR"
 "State Technical Committee Sc. & Techn. Library"
 "Techn. Libr. of the Ministry for Agric. Engineering"
 "Techn. Libr. of the State Planning Commission"
 "Techn. Libr., P. O. Box 1056"
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 "Technical Library of the House of Culture"
 "Technical Library of the State Planning Commission"
 "'Tekhnoexport, ' Inc. "
 "Telegraph Agency of USSR"
 "The Palace of Soviets, Library of the Construction Office"



AMTORG TRADING CORPORATION
210 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 16, N.Y.

March 28, 1949

IN YOUR REPLY PLEASE
MENTION OUR REFERENCE

Stanley Co., of America
321 W 44th St.
New York, N.Y.

Gentlemen:


We are interested in obtaining first-hand information relative to your Company and will greatly appreciate receiving your Annual Financial Report for 1948, in triplicate, when and if it is available for general distribution.

Sincerely yours,

O. Bogdanov

O. Bogdanov,
Economic Department

Refer to page 6.



U.S.S.R. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
CENTRAL LIBRARY OF FOREIGN CATALOGUES

Moscow,

Kulbyshev St., 6 " 9 " April

194 8

Messrs

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

Jones & Laughlin bldg.

Pittsburgh 30, Pa.

USA

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Thanking you in anticipation of your kind attention to this matter, we remain

Yours truly
USSR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE



Refer to page 9.